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Open-Border Immigration Policy: 




In this article we argue for a world in which open borders are the rule and not 
the exception. This argument is based on the general recognition of ius migrandi 
as a basic right of persons. An open-border immigration policy is preferable—at 
least from a normative standpoint—to the typical policies designed to control or 
block borders through the simplistic mode of constructing walls. On the basis of 
a global conception of distributive justice as suggested by cosmopolitan egalitar-
ians, we claim that open-door policies—or, failing in that, the implementation of a 
system of economic compensation for poor countries—provide powerful means to 
respond to the enormous inequalities that exist between countries and represent an 
appropriate way to order current migratory flows.
Keywords: 1. immigration policy, 2. border control, 3. human rights, 4. state 
sovereignty, 5. distributive global justice.
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Resumen
En este artículo se arguye a favor de un mundo en donde las fronteras abiertas 
sean la regla y no la excepción. Para ello, se presentan dos tipos de argumentos. El 
primero se basa en el reconocimiento general del ius migrandi como un derecho 
fundamental de las personas. Además de un modo idóneo de ordenar los actuales 
flujos migratorios, una política migratoria de fronteras abiertas es preferible, al 
menos desde un punto de vista normativo, a las habituales políticas diseñadas para 
controlar o bloquear las fronteras mediante la construcción de muros. El segundo 
se asienta sobre una concepción global de la justicia distributiva desarrollada por 
los igualitaristas cosmopolitas, se sostiene que una política de puertas abiertas –o, 
en su defecto, un modelo de compensación económica– constituiría un modo de 
responder a las enormes desigualdades existentes entre los países.
Palabras clave: 1. política de inmigración, 2. control fronterizo, 3. derechos 
humanos, 4. soberanía del Estado, 5. justicia global distributiva.
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Introduction1
While the elimination of borders has long been encouraged by 
thinkers who have been dismissed as being utopian and of minor 
importance, the idea has recently been revived and advanced by re-
spected promoters of neoliberal globalization who, equipped with 
an ultra-liberal or libertarian ideology, defend the free circulation 
not only of goods but also, consequently, of people in a world with-
out barriers. Indeed, a wide-ranging, animated academic debate 
has arisen around the desirability and viability of a world with 
open borders2. The heart of the controversy lies not in the radical 
elimination of border policies, but rather in controlling borders 
for the passage of human beings, that is, in recognizing the free 
circulation of persons.
Freedom of movement around the planet is a basic right of all 
human beings. The burden of proof falls on those who defend 
suspending or restricting it. This supposition is the point of depar-
ture for this article; however, instead of taking up space to defend 
this right, we will instead work to show the widespread practices 
intended to deny it, muddle it, or question its essential character. 
Also, a second goal, no less important, of this article will be to 
show that the general recognition of ius migrandi as a basic right 
of persons represents a way to order the current migratory flows 
that—from a normative standpoint as well as a functional perspec-
tive—is preferable to the usual policies designed to control or even 
block borders through the construction of walls. As a result, we 
1 This article is part of the results of a research project leaded by the author, 
funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness: “Human rights 
and global justice in the context of the international migrations” (FFI2013-42521-P). 
I would like to thank Astrid Wagner and Enrique Sepúlveda for their helpful sug-
gestions and corrections. This paper has been translated from Spanish by Robert 
Lavigna.
2 “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” was published by Joseph 
Carens in 1986, breaking new ground in this debate. From a liberal perspective, the 
now-classic article addresses the ethical justifiability of the criteria for admission and 
selection of immigrants. Since then, he has continued to argue for a world with open 
borders (Carens, 2013). For more about the current debate on the issue, see Wilcox, 
2009, and for a critical discussion, see Hosein, 2013.
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will defend a world in which the opening of borders is the rule and 
not the exception. A third aspect of the article connects with the 
arguments put forward by cosmopolitan egalitarians who tend to 
see in open borders a way to respond to the enormous inequalities 
that exist between countries, arguments based on a global concep-
tion of justice. These latter kinds of arguments should not be un-
derstood as supplementary to the arguments focusing on freedom 
of movement as a human right. They belong to a different argu-
mentative approach, particularly used in the debate with those 
who do not accept the supreme value of freedom of movement.
Recognizing that borders are firmly anchored in the collective 
thinking of political communities, what follows is a critical work 
of political imagination that admits from the start the enormous 
difficulty of constructing alternative mental maps. In the last sec-
tion of the article, we argue for the need to set in motion a public 
debate about the opening of borders, and how making innovative 
proposals—even if they might be considered too utopian—is a 
wise action to take.
The Right of Persons to Circulate Freely
To speak about the right of persons to circulate freely in today’s 
world is to take a walk through a minefield of paradoxes. To 
start with, it should be completely normal for the entire surface 
of the planet we inhabit to be accessible to anyone who is able to 
move around. After all, the whole planet is the common prop-
erty of humanity (albeit with the permission of the other animal 
species that live here), property that each generation receives as 
an undeserved inheritance. And if the Earth is a common good 
(and probably the most genuine one), the access to all its differ-
ent parts must be universally guaranteed. From the aforesaid, 
a way of conceiving one’s relation with the territory can be in-
ferred that obliges and constrains both visitors and hosts (Thie-
baut, 2010:550–551).
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The continued occupation of a specific territory by a hu-
man group—a historical fact repeated thousands of times, be it 
through peaceful or violent means—generates certain rights of 
use that nonetheless cannot negate or distort the most basic right 
of all individuals to interact with other human beings or cancel 
the obligation to admit individuals from other places. The right 
to interact as well as the obligation to welcome can be found in an 
abundance of different cultural contexts3.
From this type of approach so succinctly outlined, it would be 
fitting to derive the affirmation of ius migrandi as a corollary: the 
right of everyone not only to move around the planet, but also 
to change their residence and settle wherever it suits them. The 
possibility of deciding where to live is a fundamental aspect of 
human freedom (and in many cases it is also a condition of the 
possibility to enjoy other freedoms and opportunities). This asser-
tion is completely evident when the person migrating is oneself. 
No one would deny this fundamental right to oneself. However, 
it does not always happen the same way when one tries to apply it 
to others. Then a thousand distinctions are made, nonsense that 
in recent times has only become more pronounced, such that the 
distance between theory and practice is abysmal. One has only to 
refer to the evidence. The free circulation of persons, as well as 
freedom of residence, is a basic human right, yet the specific way 
it is regulated suffers from a degree of asymmetry that borders 
on the absurd, a feature visible even in the most influential text 
about human rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR). Its Article 13 proclaims: “(1) Everyone has the right to 
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each 
state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including 
his own, and to return to his country.”
3 Hospitality is an extended and timeless custom prescribed by numerous reli-
gious traditions. In academic language, the universal duty of hospitality, as well as 
the correlative right to visit, was presented by Immanuel Kant (2008). Also, the 
denominated ius communicationis ac societatis—the right to travel to other regions 
of the earth and settle in them in order to enter into contact with other human 
beings—had previously been theorized by Francisco de Vitoria.
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Stated directly: “Emigration is a human right, but immigration 
is not” (Heller, 1992). This is in fact what can be inferred from 
current international legislation on the subject, inspired in the 
cited article from the UDHR. The declaration recognizes the right 
of every person to leave the country they are a citizen of, as well 
as the right to return to this country, yet it says nothing about 
the correlative obligation of other governments to accept their en-
try in the territory of their own jurisdiction. In accordance with 
the aforementioned international laws, then, a right to leave one’s 
own country exists, but in fact there is nothing about entering 
another (Cole, 2000:43–46), except in cases where one is fleeing 
from political, ethnic, or religious persecution, in which case the 
right to asylum is applied. This is, incidentally, a right positively 
protected, but frequently administered in a miserly way by many 
countries, including democratic ones, which have signed agree-
ments—beginning with Article 14 of the UDHR and continuing 
with the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees (1951/1967)—that bind them legally4.
It is true that international legislation affirms the right to emi-
grate, but it ignores its logical contrast, the right to immigrate, and 
as such, the first right ends up being violated. What fails, then, is 
the cornerstone of the construction: the right to immigrate is not 
constituted, let alone codified, in a binding way for the potential 
receiving countries. An individual right is recognized, but no spe-
cific obligations for possible recipients involved in its observation 
are indicated (Benhabib, 2005:19). For its potential beneficiaries, it 
is nothing more than a conditioned right. As such, there is a consid-
erable imbalance between the unrestricted recognition of emigra-
tory freedom and the factual submission of the right to immigrate 
to the sovereign decision of receiving countries. Nonetheless, in 
4 Among people who change their country of residence, there are two important 
groups which that must be distinguished: political refugees and economic emigrants. 
In a correlative way, the duties of governments with regard to each group are diffe-
rent, although it is not so easy to justify a different treatment. In the end, the situa-
tion of one who must flee from ideological, religious, or ethnic persecution is just as 
unbearable as having to do so in order to escape poverty.
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strict legal logic, the duty to receive is already implicit, because 
when a right is recognized, the obligation not to impede its realiza-
tion is established5. But while logic and honest interpretation fol-
low their courses, governments neglect the obligations contracted. 
In the middle of her trip, the migrant then remains trapped de facto 
in a zone of passage, in a vague regulatory zone where her rights are 
at the very least suspended.
The incoherent regulation of ius migrandi becomes obvious 
when considering the differences in dealing with intrastate and 
interstate migrations. According to the above stated Article 13.1 
of the UDHR, as well as Article 12.1 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (“Everyone lawfully within the terri-
tory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty 
of movement and freedom to choose his residence”), there are no 
restrictions to the freedom of migration inside the states. How-
ever, these regulations do not explain why the reasons that can be 
given in favor of the human right to freedom of movement and 
settlement within national borders should not be equally valid, in 
order to sustain a human right to the same freedom with cross-
border effects (Carens, 2013:239; against this standpoint, Blake, 
2013, 2014).
Reluctance with regard to a complete understanding of ius mi-
grandi is created not only within the realm of international law 
and in political praxis, but also in the realm of academia. It is thus 
doubted whether the right to emigrate automatically follows the 
right to freely settle in another country, and this despite the fact 
that this latter assertion is not a corollary of the first, or at least the 
material condition to satisfy the right to emigrate. It is not unusual 
to find typically normativist philosophers who adopt a realistic 
position on this point: 
5 Despite the above, the matter is not exempt from discussion. It would fit to 
furnish the right to emigrate with, for example, the conditional right to marry. This 
right, of course, does not imply the obligation of anyone to marry the person that 
cites said right. However, the counterpart of the subjective right to emigrate is not 
individuals, but rather governments. When a government guarantees a right, it assu-
mes the obligation to put the legal-political code at the service of the protected plan, 
so that it can at least be carried out.
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There is no right to settle for an extended period in any country of 
the world, to participate equally with equal rights in its composition, 
or to enjoy the benefits of its social system of protection. In short, 
there is no human right to immigrate. The ultra posse nemo obligatur 
principle already speaks against a universal right to immigration; 
even the resources of a generous host country can dry up. (Höffe, 
1999:356)
Bearing in mind these types of arguments in which the func-
tional imperatives of politics predominate implies disregarding 
not only moral but also other demands derived from human 
rights. If we assume basic principles like equal treatment and non-
discrimination are valid, the burden of proof on this point falls 
on whoever argues in favor of limiting freedom of movement and 
settlement: 
The onus of proof therefore lies upon a state claiming the right to 
keep from entering or settling in its territory one who wishes to do 
so. We must ask in what cases a state has such a right, not in which 
cases one who wishes to immigrate has the right to enter. (Dum-
mett, 2004:118) 
Another different matter is that, from an analytical perspec-
tive, there is a distinction between the entrance conditions of 
immigrants and the legal treatment that must be given to those 
who are already settled in the country. In principle, they are 
two points that admit a differentiated treatment. Given the 
case, pragmatic and current reasons can be given for justify-
ing restrictions on the entry of immigrants that, nonetheless, 
do not justify the limitation on rights of visit, and vice versa. 
It is similarly valid to differentiate between entry rights and 
the rights to belong to a political community, because while it 
makes sense to raise fewer objections over the first, the second 
can be confronted with the right of every political community 
to control the criteria that constitute its identity (Benhabib, 
2002:173).
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The migrations and, in particular, the massive forced move-
ments of persons recorded after the First World War, and espe-
cially during World War II, constitute a background of historical 
experiences that played an important role in the creation and ap-
proval of the UDHR, as they were experiences shared with greater 
or lesser proximity by all the relevant actors of the time. Free 
circulation within the country itself, as well as the possibility of 
leaving it or the right to return to one’s own country, were options 
denied millions of people during those tragic years, a rejection that 
came at an extremely high cost of human life. It is evident that 
the UDHR is a historic document, in a literal as well as a critical 
sense. Given that its achievements and weaknesses have a histori-
cal reading, if its validity is to be maintained, the interpretation 
of rights of mobility (set forth in Articles 13 and 14 of the UDHR) 
should be updated and adapted to the new historical context: 
These rights were formulated in the context of the Holocaust and 
the Cold War, and today would have to be reinterpreted in light 
of the socioeconomic, political, and cultural consequences of glo-
balization to formulate the right to mobility (Estévez, 2012:151). 
That is precisely the main intention of this article: to examine 
the possibility of shaping an open-door migration scenario, that 
is, a collection of policies that conceive of migration as one more 
element in the processes of globalization—and not as a breeding 
ground for the multiplication of social conflicts—so that it brings 
about the complete implementation of freedom of movement and 
settlement.
Walls against Free Circulation
Since the consolidation of modern national states, merely posing 
the possibility of recognizing the free circulation of persons—and 
with that, the gradual shaping of a world with open borders—is 
usually considered a direct challenge to a sacrosanct faculty tra-
ditionally attributed to said sovereign entities: controlling their 
territorial borders and reserving the right of admission. In this 
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sense, the very existence of sovereign territorial states represents a 
structural handicap for the free exercise of ius migrandi. 
With regard to freedom of circulation and residence, countries 
maintain that their regulation forms part of the domain reservé of 
their sovereignty. The prevalent notion of state sovereignty con-
tinues to hinge upon exclusive control of a specific territory and 
its borders, legal authority that also includes the regulation of for-
eigner admission procedures. As a consequence, the spontaneity 
of migratory flows remains conditioned by the constant, although 
rarely efficient, state endeavors that tend to plan them, orient 
them, and regulate them. Behind the persistence of territorial bor-
ders, one finds an implacable state machinery determined to mark 
the confines between those inside and those outside, to separate 
human beings into citizens and foreigners, an exclusive logic in ad-
dition to one that is profoundly inhospitable (Bello, 2011). This is 
not a mere theoretical assertion but rather a verified daily practice. 
In principle, according to custom and international law, the 
act of migrating does not constitute a crime. As a result, if coun-
tries took this seriously, they should abstain from deploying any 
type of policy and legislation designed to criminalize immigra-
tion that is not expressly authorized. However, they do just the 
opposite. The customary practice is to close borders to immigra-
tion and the exception is conditional opening. To protect this 
conduct and serve as a perfect alibi, we are presented with the 
widespread obsession about security, which, raised to supreme im-
portance above all other considerations, dominates space and 
public discourse. The following comment by a former speaker 
of the U.S. House of Representatives is a significant expression 
of that national security rhetoric: “No serious nation in the age 
of terror can afford to have wide-open borders with millions of 
illegal aliens crossing at will” (Gingrich, 2005:86).
To close the borders to people, however, it was not necessary to 
present migrants as potential terrorists. That is only a convenient-
ly timed excuse, as the physical barriers were erected long before, 
from the moment control of movement of migrants was bolstered 
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with the fight against drug trafficking, the white-slave trade, and 
smuggling in general. The objective was no longer to keep two 
worlds with conflicting ideologies separated, as occurred until the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, but rather to impede the access of persons 
who were simply looking to improve their lives. Although the 
subject of migration was already being dealt with from a policing 
perspective (if not strictly military), the construction of new walls 
was promoted after the Twin Towers were demolished. Erected 
in an attempt to halt illegal immigration, they covered and con-
tinue to cover a considerable part of the 3,152 kilometers of bor-
der between the United States and Mexico, the longest and most 
dramatic line separating a rich country and a poor country6. Such 
barriers, equipped with cameras and high-intensity lighting and 
furnished with thermal and motion detectors, do not, however, 
prevent both countries from maintaining the most important bi-
lateral migratory nexus in the world.
However, anti-immigration barriers are not an exclusive phe-
nomenon of the United States. In fact, they have proliferated on 
all the continents and, according to some estimates, adding all 
those raised around the planet, now reach a total length of some 
18,000 kilometers (Rodier, 2012:47). Not as famous as the one 
cited above but comparable in length is the double row of 2.5-me-
ter-high wire fences that India erected 15 years ago to deter the 
migration coming from Bangladesh, and which is now more than 
2,500 kilometers long. Shorter, but much higher and more mod-
ern, are the gates of raised fences to protect the land perimeter of 
the North African Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla and spe-
cifically impede the migratory passage from Morocco. Physical 
barriers and obstacles have also been erected in different sections 
of the land border between Greece and Turkey that do not coin-
cide with the Evros River.
6 A couple of statistics can be quite eloquent in illustrating this idea and gauging 
the magnitude of the obsession with security. From, 1992 to 2009, agents of the U.S. 
Border Patrol rose in number from 4,000 to more than 20,000, and in the first man-
date term of Barack Obama alone (2009-2012), the United States deported almost 
1.5 million undocumented immigrants.
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The closing of borders has become Europe’s “migratory doc-
trine” (Wihtol de Wenden, 1999:28), and the fight against il-
legal immigration the strategy to implement it. So-called Fortress 
Europe is much more than a handy linguistic resource for jour-
nalistic use. It is a tangible reality planned with the goal of try-
ing to contain planetary poverty7. Related to this is the tendency 
observed in the European Union to de-judicialize the processes 
of detention and expatriation of undocumented persons, with the 
consequent failure of the right to effective legal protection.
The construction of walls and the militarization of borders is 
becoming an increasingly common practice, yet it does not detain 
the international passage of persons. No border is known to be 
impassible. Border police, armies, observation flights, television 
cameras, sophisticated systems of sensors: None of these achieve 
the effectiveness required in the pursuit of their goal. The same 
can be said of the intensification and refinement of measures of 
control in airports, the preventative deployment of those controls 
to points of origin, or the generalization of the demand to for 
people to have biometric passports. None of these procedures 
serve to prevent persons from entering a country and even less to 
detain those who want to leave their own country because they 
are dogged by desperation. In addition to nourishing a lucrative 
business that a powerful, promptly generated security industry 
benefits from (Rodier, 2012:19–45; Andersson, 2014), they just 
serve to trick the migrants in a more subtle way, to increase their 
physical risks as well as the prices traffickers charge for smug-
gling them.
Over time, these methods have increased in sophistication. The 
latest trend is the so-called extraterritorialization of border con-
trol, and the European Union has already become a real expert in 
7 It is no metaphor, but rather a structured system of control and surveillance: 
“Fortress Europe consists of three fundamental pillars: a panoptic brain, a common 
system of control of the borders and a containment zone of allied countries.” (Davis, 
2008:256). For the joint administration of the European Union’s external borders, 
FRONTEX, was created in 2004. The budget of this European Agency has been in-
creasing exponentially since then.
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it. It is about entrusting third world countries—which migrants 
must pass through before reaching their destination—with the 
task of closing the channels of communication between countries 
of origin and those receiving. As compensation for their work, 
these countries receive development grants or are awarded a privi-
leged status in trade relations. This tactic is completed with the 
signature of bilateral agreements of readmission and/or repatria-
tion with countries that often possess a less than impressive track 
record with regard to human rights.
Today, despite all the methods deployed, there are no com-
pletely hermetic spaces with respect to migrations, and that has 
its correlation in the policies followed: 
At present it is not accurate to speak of border closure or policies 
of zero immigration, but rather of a strict and conditioned regula-
tion. […] As such, the borders are transformed into airtight, strongly 
symbolic limits between countries that receive and countries that 
send people. (López, 2005:116)
It instead deals with a selective closure according to the type of 
person who tries to access state territory. Walls, ditches, and other 
efforts to seal off the borders possess demagogic content that is 
difficult to hide: “They are erected as a solution to the problem, 
when they can only contain some of the symptoms of inequality, 
and not for very long. They are built to offer a symbol of firmness 
to the people behind them” (Moré, 2007:15). Indeed, the walls 
erode the very sovereignty they seek to sustain. The more walled 
a state is, the more the sovereignty it actually proclaims wanes 
(Brown, 2010). 
The severe policies of controlling the flows and jealous surveil-
lance of the borders—although at times no more than gestures of 
scant operational capacity in relation to the goal pursued, albeit 
ones that have negative and palpable consequences for the persons 
affected—are a handy resource used by many countries to try to 
convince their citizens that the nations still possess sovereignty 
and decision-making power. The facts, on the contrary, show that 
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countries are losing sovereignty and decision-making power com-
pletely. On many matters, the processes of transfer of effective 
power to international authorities (International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank, etc.) have generated a banalization of state power. 
For their part, markets, which know no boundaries, are those 
that define the employment situation and social and economic 
context, and not the other way around, as would be proper in a 
democratic system. The logic of the state and the logic of capital 
confront each other, and in this duel, apparently, the first is at 
a disadvantage. However, in matters of “emigration, naturaliza-
tion, nationality, and expulsion,” as Hannah Arendt (1979:278) 
pointed out some time ago, state sovereignty is still practically 
absolute, such that on said matters “the national state claims its 
old splendor in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders” 
(Sassen, 1996:63). This shocking reaction very probably responds 
to the evidence that these days, realistically speaking, there is 
little left for a country to monopolize that is not the integrity of 
its borders, so “the idea of territory” has become the “diacritical 
point of sovereignty” (Appadurai, 1996:49).
In a world where goods production, trade and finance, com-
munications, transport, and news take place on a unified world 
stage, where most of the barriers have been lifted and the flows 
and exchanges have been liberalized, we observe the enormous 
paradox that the mobility of persons is besieged everywhere (Bar-
ry and Goodin, 1992). All the factors that are involved in produc-
tion have freedom of movement, except workers (Mezzadra and 
Neilson, 2013:95–130). When the borders are not firmly closed, 
urgent, expensive entry visas are required or limited access quotas 
are imposed (connected, for example, to the possession of a spe-
cific nationality or professional qualification). Migration policies 
are in fact determined by discouraging and increasingly restrictive 
ordinances for the admission and mobility of persons—certain 
persons, always the most vulnerable and with the least resourc-
es—across international borders. Here is where this globalized 
world in so many aspects shows its darker side: a bordered world, 
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a world for which strategies of surveillance and control of people 
run amok. With regard to the circulation of goods, the logic of 
the liberal economy is imposed on the discourse of border con-
trol. However, regarding the circulation of persons, the universal-
ist logic of human rights is passed over before this same discourse.
The free circulation of persons has become a coveted factor 
of distinction and social stratification. The high rate of human 
mobility, one of the distinctive signs of these times, in fact tends 
not to be distributed at all equally. On a planet with tremendous 
disparities in income, resources and opportunities, not everyone 
can afford—nor is afforded—the luxury of being cosmopolitan. 
What is more, most of the people who inhabit the planet are not 
allowed to move freely. For some, however, the crossing of bor-
ders is merely a formality. Most countries use the institution of 
borders following the tenets of distinction and selection, and this 
practice ends up being expressed in a dual regime of circulation 
of individuals, a fact perhaps much more serious than the dif-
ferentiation between persons and goods (Balibar, 2005:83–84). 
Both distinctions are difficult to justify in normative terms, all 
the more for those societies that proclaim human rights to be 
a foundation of their internal governance. These societies have 
dialectically disarmed themselves to publicly defend weighty ar-
guments against the universal scope of these rights and make 
borders legitimate obstacles to the free mobility of persons. If 
they operate like that, as in fact they do, they end up settling in a 
permanent contradiction, which, as common as it may be, never 
ceases to create dysfunctional internal imbalances.
Human Mobility and Global Justice
As a general rule, border walls express a patent desire to exclude 
the most underprivileged people on the planet. Not coincidental-
ly, barriers are erected on the most unequal borders in the world, 
in economic terms (Moré, 2007). Their maintenance implies 
banking on the persistence of models of containment that are as 
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inefficient as they are unjust. Locking up poor countries in their 
deprivation neither solves nor alleviates the underlying problem: 
Far from diminishing, the inequalities and differences in devel-
opment grow. Not only is the policing of borders impossible, but 
it is becoming more unacceptable in social and political terms, 
given the enormous cost in materials and, above all, human lives 
it entails. The migration policies developed by numerous receiv-
ing countries, inspired in a philosophy of tight control and even 
criminalization of undesired immigration, also generate very seri-
ous side effects with regard to equity.
The way in which each society reacts in political and legal terms 
to the phenomenon of immigration is an excellent indicator when 
it comes to comprehend its basic structure and its conception of 
justice. Ethnic stratification of the job market, differences in the 
granting of rights, and residential segregation are among the dark 
social phenomena that have emerged in democratic societies on 
facing migratory processes, and that contravene the very principles 
and values these societies pretend to be sustained on. The real situ-
ation that many migrants go through, from the moment they be-
gin their journey until they manage to settle in a new country (if 
they in fact do so), shows that the implementation of the principles 
of justice—human rights included among them, of course—is still 
conceived from the restricted perspective of each country’s inter-
ests8. All along that route, they are the target of multiple restric-
tions that countries impose on them, often in a discriminatory way, 
to access and stay in their territory. On limiting the range of ap-
plication of the demands of justice, reducing it to the group of the 
country’s nationals, the inherent universalist scope of said notion is 
being substantially altered. Its recipients, that is to say, those wor-
8 With regard to migration, the sovereignty of countries is not absolute, but in-
stead limited in general by the respect for human rights: “In extreme circumstances, 
denial of the right of immigration may constitute a failure to respect human rights or 
the universal duty of rescue. [...] The most basic rights and duties are universal, and 
not contingent on specific institutional relations between people” (Nagel, 2005:130). 
A different matter—and no less important—is determining what specific situations 
of need sovereignty should yield to.
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thy of fair treatment, are all the inhabitants of the planet, and not 
only citizens of a specific country (Velasco, 2013).
The fact that international migratory movements have become 
considerable in recent decades is no anomaly, but rather a reason-
able response to the great differences in the standard of living 
between different countries. Differences in income within each 
country, in many cases still highly significant, pale in comparison 
with the differences that exist between countries, such that “at 
present, it is much more important, generally speaking, to have 
had the good fortune to be born in a rich country than to belong 
to the upper class, middle class or lower class of that country” 
(Milanovic, 2010:129). There are many people who, because they 
were born on the wrong side of the border, have no chance of ever 
becoming as wealthy as the poorest people in the United States, 
Japan, or Western Europe (Velasco, 2016). Migrating from one 
country to another makes it possible for individuals to transcend 
national categories that are the key to inequality in the world.
In general, countries always act on the basis of national inter-
ests. From there, restrictive migration policies serve primarily to 
try to protect privileges and preserve the prosperity of a political 
community and, in particular, those born in each country. Being 
born in one country or another is merely a question of chance 
that nonetheless entails an entire series of interlinked effects. The 
first is being a member of a specific country, a formal condition 
that bequeaths a world full of advantages for some and condemns 
others to a life of limited prospects. “We do not deserve to have 
been born into a particular society any more than we deserve to 
have been born into a particular family. Those who are not im-
migrants have done nothing to become members of their society” 
(Nagel, 2005:128), but nonetheless enjoy an inherited title for the 
enjoyment of undeserved privileges compared with those who are 
not full members of society, but live within the same territory. Or 
put more eloquently: 
To be born a citizen of an affluent state in Europe or North America 
is like being born into the nobility […] To be born a citizen of a poor 
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country in Asia or Africa is like being born into the peasantry in the 
Middle Ages […] Limiting entry to rich liberal democratic states is 
a crucial mechanism for protecting a birthright privilege. (Carens, 
2013:226)
In this way, many people begin life with undeserved social and 
material disadvantages—arbitrary disadvantages, for certain—
just for being born in a specific country, a misfortune that is not 
a coincidence and one for which they should be compensated 
(Shachar, 2009). Inside a country, this could be prevented by a 
contributive system of redistributive taxation and social welfare 
programs. However, in an interdependent world such as ours 
composed of countries very unequal in wealth and resources, this 
seems difficult to articulate. The current system of separate sov-
ereign countries is an unfortunate obstacle to achieving global 
justice (Nagel, 2005:119). As that is an arduous task, it would 
be wise to look for ways that foster international cooperation on 
this subject.
While important steps have been taken in the last two decades 
to increase and regulate economic trade (for example, giving the 
World Trade Organization considerable regulatory powers and 
creating an obligatory jurisdictional procedure for all of its mem-
bers), it is surprising that nothing has been done to govern inter-
national migrations. This negligence is no coincidence, but rather 
obeys the conviction of many countries that everything concerned 
with the management of migratory affairs is of their exclusive 
competence. However, the genuine planetary extent of migratory 
flows and the diversity of agents involved in them greatly lessens 
the effectiveness of countries and imposes, as in so many other 
challenges of our time, the adoption of a multilateral focus to 
deal more completely with the processes triggered by these flows. 
For some time now, the conviction that it is not only appropri-
ate but also mandatory to broaden the perspective from which 
to examine social matters in their complexity and multiplicity 
has been consolidating in social sciences, as well as political and 
moral philosophy. There is an awareness that all of us inhabit only 
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one world and that, as such, a merely state-centered point of view 
is inadequate for dealing with the complex problems that arise in 
countries. This is also true for conflicts and problems caused by 
migrations: If countries look for solutions separately, they will run 
aground within their reduced area of operation.
In this order of things, a previous condition for amplifying 
the scale of analysis and adopting a global conception of justice 
is to abandon “methodological nationalism,” that is, to over-
come that narrow epistemic focus that considers different coun-
tries to be the basic way to organize the world and, as such, the 
basic units for the study of social processes (Pogge, 2005). A 
more global focus—or, as Ulrich Beck (2006) put it, a “cosmo-
politan vision”—appears as a strategic set response to the needs 
of analysis of a new historical and social reality, apt for a world 
that is more and more ours, a world where individuals share and 
are aware of sharing, directly or indirectly, one same finite natu-
ral environment. In a global context, where systemic problems 
of planetary reach are more and more pressing, it is necessary 
for all countries to pool resources, technology, news services, 
and also their authority; that is, a necessarily multilateral and 
coordinated response is needed, one that can also “radically re-
structure the world economic system” in accordance with the 
obligations of justice (Beitz 1979:127). Such a redistribution 
cannot consist of cosmetic changes or of rhetorical appeals, but 
instead must have an effect at the structural level.
From this broad view of planetary scope, some theorists of 
global justice have taken a stand in favor of the opening of borders 
(or at least a migratory policy of crossable borders), which is not 
the same as a world without borders. Contemporary debates deal 
more with the first than the second option, which is considered 
too radical and untimely (Wellman, 2010). The arguments put 
forward are much the same as those normally proposed in sup-
port of social or distributive justice. It is argued that if equality 
of opportunities is a basic principle of justice, limiting the op-
tion to migrate according to one’s place of birth or citizenship 
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implies unacceptable discrimination (Arnsperger and Van Parijs, 
2003:97-105). In this same sense, it is noted that confining indi-
viduals to reduced spaces and restricting access to resources avail-
able in other countries limit the basic opportunities necessary to 
lead a dignified life (Loewe, 2010). It is also stressed that, con-
sidered from the perspective of distributive justice, restrictions of 
migrations towards wealthy countries constitute an illegitimate 
way to try to support unequal participation in the planet’s finite 
resources. On the contrary, through the implementation of some 
system of global economic governance (which does not require 
as such the constitution of a world government, but instead the 
establishment of multilateral institutions with reinforced powers), 
the free circulation of persons could be a catalyst of global redis-
tribution such that it increases the potential of improving the fate 
of the most underprivileged on the planet (Arnsperger and Van 
Parijs, 2003:97–105).
One of the first implications of the idea of justice is the demand 
to put an end to situations of active injustice, and to compen-
sate those harmed by the wrong that was done to them. But the 
critical-normative potential of the value of justice does not end 
there. In the sphere of migration, that is obvious: Behind many 
human displacements, there are situations of systemic or structural 
injustice, which contribute to aggravating the fate of the most un-
derprivileged even more, a rather frequent form of injustice that 
should not go without some chance of obtaining compensatory 
reparation. It does not matter whether such injustices are the re-
sult of an explicit wish to hurt or of the apathy or disinterest that 
keeps certain processes and structures unscathed. What matters is 
whether they cause “some people’s options to be blocked off, and 
they suffer the threat of hardship, while others obtain significant 
benefits” (Young, 2011:69). In that case, those who unfairly ben-
efited have to compensate those unfairly harmed. But how does 
one face the negative consequences of the unequal distribution 
of the world’s wealth? Put more specifically, how does one assign 
costs of mitigation to these effects?
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In a world with blatant inequalities, the most prosperous 
countries that benefit from this state of things are obligated to 
contribute to the redistribution of wealth in the world. It is not 
about mere moral responsibility, but instead international legal 
responsibility resulting from the complete assumption of human 
rights (Articles 22 and 25.1 of the UDHR). The responsibility to 
act when a government fails to meet the basic rights of subsis-
tence is generically attributed to the international community 
and, more specifically, to each of the particular countries that 
compose it9. The way to handle that responsibility is not, how-
ever, prescribed in advance (Beitz, 2009:194–206). On the in-
ternal plane, governments normally put different measures into 
effect to achieve greater distributive equity and try to overcome 
the most immediate disadvantages that some people suffer, be 
it through transfers (unemployment benefit, compensatory pen-
sions, etc.) or subsidized social services (education, health, etc.). 
At the global level, different distributive options along the lines 
of these measures could be considered:
International aid is the equivalent of a redistributive fiscal transfer 
mechanism with a potential to effect dynamic change, for instance, 
through investments in health, education and infrastructure. Simi-
larly, international trade practices can open—or close—opportuni-
ties for poor countries and their citizens to capture a bigger share 
of the economic pie. (United Nations Development Programme, 
2005:39)
Leaving the satisfaction of the duties of justice in the hands of 
volunteer and interim aid seems quite insufficient: “Justice as ordi-
narily understood requires more than mere humanitarian assistance 
9 Although countries have an original responsibility to respect, protect and promote 
human rights in their sphere of sovereignty, the international community has the 
derived responsibility to help countries uphold the human rights of their people. This 
latter responsibility comes into effect only when a particular country fails to fulfil its 
obligations. Moreover, its enforcement is gradual and flexible: it ranges from holding 
countries accountable to different types of pressure, or even to measures intended to 
reinforce the states’ capacity to accomplish their tasks (Beitz, 2009:106–117).
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to those in desperate need” (Nagel, 2005:119)10. Contribution to a 
system of international compensatory transfers (a type of payment 
of global taxes) would then be an option, but not the only one, nor 
always the most effective. A major overhaul of the current trade 
laws that concede tangible advantages to the most underprivileged 
countries would be another possibility. Among the possible com-
pensatory measures of global inequalities, there is one more that 
should be seriously considered. It deals with arbitrating a policy 
of open borders that, in addition to being a way to implement the 
human right to free circulation, it would carry out that compensa-
tory function. One of its first formulations is owed to Dummett 
(2001:70), who proposes that: 
As long as there persists an immense contrast between rich and poor 
nations, justice, which demands that the rich correct this as quickly 
and completely as possible, also demands that they do not erect or 
strengthen their boundaries against the entry of people coming from 
poor countries. 
Through the easing of immigration restrictions in rich coun-
tries—above all, with the opening of more channels for legal im-
migration—we would seek to effectively guarantee the rights to 
subsistence of people who live in the poorest countries on the 
planet. Only from a disproportionate exaltation of the national 
against the foreign can the restriction of access of foreigners be 
understood as a legitimate mechanism to conserve the resources 
of a country, for the sole benefit of the citizens of that country. 
With reason, this resistance that—which the most developed so-
cieties show when it comes to sharing their rights and social ser-
vices with migrants who come from poor countries—has been 
10 In his The Law of Peoples, Rawls contemplates a mere duty of international as-
sistance: “Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable condi-
tions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regiment” (Rawls, 
2001:37). However, the demand for no institutional arrangement of international 
reach is assumed. Moreover, just as Rawls conceives it (2001:105–120), satisfying 
this duty of assistance does not necessarily require transfers of resources.
MIGRACIONES INTERNACIONALES, VOL. 8, NÚM. 4, JULIO-DICIEMBRE DE 201662
censored as an expression of an unsupportive “welfare chauvin-
ism” (Habermas, 1992:651–660). 
In a setting where the division between the levels of wealth in 
different countries is enormous, in addition to growing, the rich 
(or relatively rich) countries would be legitimized in continu-
ing to keep the power to control admission of foreigners into 
their territory, only if they meet certain conditions and, specifi-
cally, if they eliminate the trade barriers towards the poorest 
countries, if they modify the existing international economic 
institutions, and/or if they intervene through some kind of re-
distributive tax in a more just share in the planet’s resources; 
that is, only if they contribute significantly and to the degree 
their possibilities permit in the global establishment of distrib-
utive justice (Kymlicka, 2001:270–272; Pogge, 2002:196–215). 
One can point to an argument that updates certain ideas from 
Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant (2008) in favor of this po-
sition11. Earth, our planet, is originally common property of 
everyone who comprises humanity, and this situation—which 
does not question the private rights of usufruct—imposes con-
ditions on its use. One of them is that countries that underuse 
their lands and other natural resources have the duty either to 
admit immigrants from countries with people with fewer re-
sources per capita, or compensate them for denying them access 
(Blake and Risse, 200612).
11 The range of doctrinal sources is, however, much wider. Even for the most ins-
piring eminence of possessive individualism, John Locke, the private appropriation 
of common goods, like the earth, is only legitimate if there remains “enough, and 
as good, left in common for others” (Second Treatise of Government, Chap. V, “Of 
property”, §27). It is equally known that also for Christian philosophy, at least in the 
work of Thomas Aquinas, private property deeds, far from being absolute, are condi-
tioned by the satisfaction of obligations with respect to the whole society.
12 Referring to an idea of Grotius’s, which Kant (2008) made his own afterwards 
(“the common ownership of the earth”), Blake and Risse’s argument is that all the 
members of humanity have an equal moral right to the planet’s physical resources, 
and that from this assumption, normative limitations are derived in legitimate re-
gimes of property, including immigration regimes. What these authors propose is, 
essentially, that countries do not have an unlimited or unconditional discretionality 
in their policies of immigration admission.
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This migratory approach inspired in an idea of global distribu-
tive justice is quite close to the emphasis on reparation, that the 
so-called post-colonial theory postulates. Fair distribution on a 
global level is not at all incompatible with compensation for dam-
ages caused by the colonial past. Both perspectives defend the 
obligation to compensate for damages unfairly infringed caused 
throughout Western colonial history, whose disastrous legacy has 
too often given rise to the emergence of failed states. These coun-
tries are precisely those that nourish the main contemporary mi-
gratory flows, so it is not difficult to recognize the presence of the 
descendants of the old colonizers in the new displacements that 
arrive now as immigrants in conditions that frequently violate 
human rights.
Of course, it is appropriate not only to question the idea 
that migrations from poor countries towards richer ones make 
it possible to have more equitable access to the planet’s finite 
resources, but to even think that the international transfer of 
resources to fight global poverty would be much more efficient 
than the admission of migrants to wealthy countries (Pogge, 
2005). Even in that case, it is difficult to deny that a possible 
opening of borders to migratory flows entails relief from the 
severe poverty that afflicts the population of so many countries: 
not a radical solution, but a partial answer. Leaving aside the 
normative consideration—not at all banal—that the capacity 
of deciding where one wants to live is a basic and unnegotiable 
element of the freedom of every human being, migrations have 
an enormous instrumental value insofar as they represent an 
opportunity to improve the development not only of the people 
who migrate, but also of the different countries involved, both 
of origin and destination. If, from a strictly economic perspec-
tive, reasons of efficiency are agreed on to justify the liberaliza-
tion of trade, similar reasons can be put forward in favor of 
human mobility and, in particular, labor mobility. This way 
the world would improve in its levels of redistribution and, as 
such, equity.
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The migratory effort is, very probably, the one that of-
fers more returns to the individuals on the adventure of social 
mobility, far beyond the processes of upward social mobility 
through education, work, changes in the redistributive model, 
or changes in access to public goods (Korzeniewizc and Mo-
ran, 2009:107–109; Rodrik, 2011:286–287; De la Dehesa, 
2008:117). If we keep this in mind, it is inevitable to reach the 
conclusion that the obstacles to mobility that are imposed on 
those workers seriously violate the principle of equity on a global 
scale. In a world without extreme poverty, the intensity of mi-
gratory flows would very probably diminish. But this is not the 
case, and potential migrants cannot be asked to wait for the 
results of a convergence of the levels of quality of live life on a 
global scale, a possible convergence whose outcome is nonethe-
less uncertain. Any means that—without damaging the vital 
rights of third parties—serves to attenuate the severe levels of 
poverty in the world must be applauded and even supported on 
the basis of pragmatic as well as moral reasons. Migrations will 
be advantageous in the development of the parties involved, as 
they offer people who undertake them the opportunity to work 
and possibly send money back home, while the labor force and 
social capital in the receiving countries are increased (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2009).
It would also be wise to rid oneself of certain preconceived 
notions not subject to empirical contrast as is the case of the 
assertion that the opening of borders is tantamount to legiti-
mizing a form of invasion, peaceful though it may be, or en-
couraging an enormous influx of migrants that renders the 
sustainability of the receiving countries unviable. It is often 
forgotten that migrating is not a simple option and that it im-
plies several existential ruptures that are not usually confronted 
if one does not have powerful reasons (Brock, 2009:194–195). 
Instead, the tendency of people is to live in their own country, 
where they have their family and know the language, so that 
there are reasons to sustain that migrations will continue to be 
VELASCO / OPEN-BORDER IMMIGRATION POLICY 65
a relatively minority phenomenon (as of 2012, some 216 mil-
lion people, 3.15 % of the world population, live outside their 
countries of origin [United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, 2013]). Furthermore, the assumed practical 
impossibility of simultaneously maintaining a policy of open 
borders and a vast welfare state is based on superficial calcula-
tions that do not consider the net economic contribution of the 
immigrant population. Moreover, these calculations ignore the 
need recognized by numerous developed countries to compen-
sate, via new immigrant workers, the growing deficit of their 
pension systems resulting from the concurrence of a low birth 
rate and a long life expectancy.
Certainly, there are different ways to handle the general re-
sponsibility of alleviating poverty in the world and diminishing 
global inequalities. Choosing the way is something that is left up 
to governments. In any case, rich countries have to let the others 
participate in the sharing of the common pie. As concerns migra-
tion, the practical consequence drawn from that is not at all banal: 
it It is not obligatory to open the borders, but rejecting this option 
has its price. If countries did it, they would then be obligated to 
offer alternative solutions. They would maintain their traditional 
discretionality regarding the closing of borders (one of the few 
areas where countries still maintain a certain remnant of their 
tainted sovereignty) but the margin would be severely reduced 
and it would not be free.
In many cases, certainly not in all, the transgression of borders 
is only a small symptom of a bad pandemic called global poverty 
and injustice. It is difficult to try to control international migra-
tory movements without implementing fundamental measures 
that balance the distribution of wealth and make it possible for 
all countries to share the benefits of globalization equally. One 
cannot fight against a serious illness, let alone try to eradicate it, 
by fighting only the symptoms.
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The Utopia of Open Borders
If for a long time the main question that was in the background of 
the philosophical and political reflection about the phenomenon 
of migration was the right to emigrate, at present the point of con-
troversy instead turns around immigration rights and the corre-
sponding state obligations to admit foreigners and even naturalize 
them. Related to this change of focus is the universal recognition 
of the right to emigrate as a human right (Article 13.2 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights) and as such, its consolida-
tion as a protected right. Now we need to go one step further and 
recognize the complementary right to immigrate, without which 
the proclamation of the first is no more than empty words. It is in 
this scenario of debate where the opening of borders acquires its 
most complete significance.
It is quite possible that the proposal as we have just outlined 
it, despite the internal coherence that it might have, could be 
labeled utopian. In today’s world, a world still adjusted to the 
model of sovereign national countries, a world that is still West-
phalian (as the principle of non-interference in internal affairs 
is still in effect and national borders still deserve maximum in-
ternational protection), the free circulation of persons certainly 
presents itself as something for which the right circumstances 
for its effective recognition still do not exist. But it is also true 
that this particular utopia is in the same line of those that have 
made the world move: a utopia of a world without slaves, or 
the utopia of a world without a subordinate gender, to mention 
only two examples of social goals that in other times seemed 
completely unobtainable. The proposal formulated here is, in-
stead, a micro-utopia, which does not try to be a perfect world, a 
paradise on Earth, but simply to show a way to avoid or at least 
mitigate the great and constant evils generated by the obsession 
with control in which most contemporary countries are trapped, 
a little utopia concentrated on the prevention of damages caused 
by that controlling desire.
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The value of utopian thought as a potential motor for social 
change is quite obvious. However, the formulation of a utopia will 
only be useful if, in addition to being desirable, it satisfies mini-
mum requirements of viability and, as a consequence, outlines a 
possible path. There are numerous material conditions that must 
come together for it to be put into practice and that must be consid-
ered (Somek, 1998:410). An open-door immigration policy—or, 
alternatively, a global system of indemnification that compensates 
poor countries for the closure of borders—would completely re-
configure the state of affairs. That new scenario is not only a de-
sirable horizon, but also a proposal not less viable than others sold 
as being more reasonable. Without falling into naïveté, it is worth 
asking whether in fact the opposite option advocated from posi-
tions self-designated as realistic is not much more utopian. And 
with that question, one does not allude exclusively to the complete 
closure of borders, to the “zero immigration” policy so desired by 
some chauvinist populisms, but also to the simple hope of main-
taining migratory flows under state control. Next to the reiterated 
inconsistencies that the political administration of these flows gen-
erates, the opening of borders presents itself as a dignified reason-
able option to be taken into consideration. It is time that a public 
debate about a policy of opening was taken up in earnest, and it 
should also be discussed whether the costs/benefits balance that 
said policy causes is more or less favorable than the balance result-
ing from a policy of absolute containment of migratory flows.
The most important social changes throughout history have 
not been the result of inexorable structural processes, but rather 
a product of human intervention through political mobilizations 
and social struggles. The limits to what is possible are not drawn 
by the limits of what really exists, as what is real, in addition to 
being contingent, can be modified. Meanwhile, keeping in mind 
an option located beyond what really exists, not beyond what is 
possible, is essential to be able to critique that increasingly wide-
spread perspective that presents human mobility as a potential 
threat to the established order.
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